



## The Imaginary of the Enemy in Calais

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**Abstract** Resulting from a research project on the development of vigilantism in France, the article focuses specifically on the anti-migrant groups "*Sauvons Calais*" and "*Calaisiens en Colere*", close to the far right, which intend to mobilize the population of Calais against migrants. To do this, they put in place a political framing depicting Calais as the ground of an invasion. Migrants, often dehumanized, are likened to an enemy from the outside whose objective is to destroy the city and take control of it. For the anti-migrant groups, the figure of the external enemy is completed by a figure of the internal enemy. Migrant support movements are depicted as infiltrated subversive agents, paralyzing public action from within. The No-border movement, perceived as anarchist, would be the worst incarnation of this figure of the inner enemy.

This paper aims to question the production of the imaginary figure of the enemy. In a schmittian perspective, the supposed peril of the absolute enemy that is the "them" represented by the figure of the migrant make the existence of the "we" possible. By its agonistic discourse, the collective creates two figures of the "we": a figure of the weak "us", composed of the Calais population and a "strong" one: the community in action, the people of Calais who actively fight immigration

**Keywords** Anti-migrant groups | imaginary of the enemy | Calais | agonistic politics | vigilantism





This article belongs to the following themes of this Ima@go issue: "The Ethnic and Political Identity Mobilization and the" rhetoric of the new politics - the use of "we" and "them". Resulting from a research project on the development of vigilantism in France, it focuses specifically on the anti-migrant groups "Sauvons Calais" and "Calaisiens en Colere", close to the far right, which intend to mobilize the population of Calais against migrants.

To do this, they have put in place a political framing depicting the city of Calais as the ground of an invasion. Migrants, often dehumanized, are likened to an enemy coming from the outside whose objective is overrun the city. For the anti-migrant groups, this figure of the external enemy is completed by a figure of the internal enemy. Migrant support movements are depicted as infiltrated subversive agents, paralyzing the French state from within. The No-border movement, perceived as anarchist, is perceived as the worst incarnation of this figure of the inner enemy.

This paper aims to question the production of the imaginary figure of the enemy. In a Schmittian perspective, the supposed peril of the absolute enemy that is the "them" - by the figure of the migrant - makes the existence of the "we" possible. By its agonistic discourse, the collective creates two figures of the "we": a figure of the weak "us", composed of the Calais population and a "strong" one: the community in action, the people of Calais who actively fight immigration.

To better understand the situation in Calais, we have to bear in mind that since the early 2000s, the city of Calais has become an important nexus of the migratory flows which cross the European Union. Since the Touquet agreements, signed in 2003 between France and the United Kingdom, border control allowing access to the British territory no longer take place in Dover, but in Calais on the French side.

This has had the indirect consequence of generating a situation where hundreds or even thousands of migrants find themselves stuck in Calais while waiting for an opportunity to go through the border. Alaux describes these people as belonging to a population "in storage". Migrants are often left without resources and live in makeshift encampments called "jungles" (from the Iranian djangal meaning forest). The living conditions are very harsh, and "jungles" regularly expelled by the police. They stay there for months or even years before being able to cross the border.

After the Arab revolutions of 2011, the number of migrants increased. After 2015, which saw an influx of migrants across Europe, the number of migrants in Calais increased to around 10,000 in 2016, concentrated in the Jules Ferry jungle. This settlement was destroyed in November 2016 and its occupants sent to CAO centers (Reception and Orientation Centers) spread throughout French territory. Since then, the situation in Calais, although less publicized, remains similar, and the police dislodges rapidly any settlement, a situation that NGOs such as Amnesty International regularly denounce as contrary to basic human rights.

In an electoral campaign context, Natacha Bouchart, Mayor of Calais, in November an appeal to the citizens of Calais on her personal Facebook page. It asked citizens to



report to the authorities any housing site that would be squatted by migrants . Sauvons Calais, an "apolitical" collective, defining itself as a group of concerned citizens, formed itself to respond to this call, to map migrant settlements and alert public opinion. The apolitical nature of the group was questioned when newspapers revealed that Kévin Rêche, their spokesperson, had a swastika tattoo on his chest . In reality, the collective is close to the far right. The group has developed a close relationship with the Parti de la France, a right-wing division of the National Rally (formerly the National Front). Kévin Rêche is also present on the lists presented by this party in the cantonal elections of March 2015 . During the summer of 2015, a new group started, Les Calaisiens en Colere. While claiming to be apolitical, its spokespersons are acquainted with the National Rally .

Both groups rely on a small core of activists. During the interviews, the Sauvons Calais activists state they are between fifteen to twenty, while the Calaisiens en Colere declare to be numbering the dozen. Nevertheless, these small numbers do not prevent them from having a strong capacity of mobilization. The events they organize can bring together up to several hundred activists. In addition, their audience on Facebook is very extensive: their publications are massively viewed and shared .

In addition to very significant activity on social networks, these groups act in the field. The Sauvons Calais group called for several demonstrations, often forbidden by public authorities. The most publicized are those of September 7, 2014, which brings together several hundred far-right activists from all over France , and that of February 6, 2016 co-organized with the PEGIDA group. The demonstrators clashed with the police, leading to the highly-commented arrest of retired paratrooper general Christian Piquemal . In addition, the group organized a mobilization of several weeks against a squat in Coulogne in February 2014. What was originally a peaceful sit-in turned into a siege, and the house became the target of stone throwing by demonstrators. It was then the target of arson after its occupants were forced to leave the premises.

The Calaisiens en Colere also organized events that brought together up to 800 people in autumn 2015. Nevertheless, they became widely known through their patrol activities. By car, they patrolled the streets of Calais and filmed migrants, in order to report in "real time" their activities. These videos are very widely followed; viewed tens or hundreds of thousands of times. In December 2015, activists abandoned patrols by car to organize "support rallies" to the neighbors of the jungle Jules Ferry, always filmed live and posted online. In a tense context, they often turned to confrontation with migrants. A video posted online by the collective provoked a media scandal, because one of the militants flashed a rubber bullet gun. Watching the video, it is possible to hear gunshots, but it is not possible to attribute these to his rubber bullet gun with certainty.



## 1. Vigilance towards the enemy

The activities of these groups are to be understood in a context of emergent vigilantism in France. This concept is defined by Gilles Favarel-Garrigues and Laurent Gayer (2016, p.9) as "a number of coercive collective practices, implemented by non-state actors in order to enforce certain norms (social or legal) and/or to exercise Justice". According to Abrahams (1998), this phenomenon is characterized by "citizens" taking control of their security, or even taking justice into their own hands, without the mediation of institutions such as the police or the justice system. It should be noted, as Walsh (2014) shows, that the development of groups focused on vigilantism is one of the methods to achieve an increased level of control around borders, which opens the question of the integration of those practices into state security dispositifs.

Finally, an important element is highlighted by Les Johnson (1996) . The latter conceived vigilantism as a social movement made up of citizens acting voluntarily, in total autonomy from the State, to fight against "crime" by using or threatening to use violence. In this case, it is the presence on French soil of a migrant population that is perceived as criminal and deviant by these groups. Furthermore, we will see that they also insist on the security threats that migrants would represent, allowing them to criminalize the social group of migrants as a whole.

Here, the concepts developed by Charles Tilly seem useful, particularly that of action repertoire, defined as: "A limited series of routines that are learned, shared and executed through a relatively deliberate choice process" (Tilly and Wood 2009, p.26). The actions of that repertoire are socially constructed, as a strategically oriented set of norms, values and practices. The form of the actions and their objectives are to be understood as fitting into a general context of political opportunities (Tarrow and Tilly 2008) .

It is also necessary to refer to the work of Lesley Wood (2017) on anti-immigration social movements in the United States, Canada and Great Britain between 2000 and 2016 . According to her, these movements are characterized by a combination of mass movements borrowing from the classical repertoires of social movements, but also to militia movements (Minutemen and Aryan Nation in the United States), which would tend to show common traits between Calais and these groups.

Loveluck's work (2016, p.135) adds to the definition of vigilantism the importance of the use of social media: "to do oneself justice by engaging online active forms of surveillance, repression or targeted deterrence, which above all go through an increase in unwanted attention or negative publicity : name and shame ". He distinguishes four dimensions of digital vigilance: reporting, investigation, tracking and organized denunciation. For Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974, pp.541-570), the main driving forces behind vigilantism are not so much about direct repression, but rather about the threat of repressive action. The publicisation of their vigilantism on Facebook gives the



Calais groups a social existence and a visibility that goes beyond simple acts of coercion. These visibility strategies will more broadly be part of what Patrick Champagne will call the "paper demonstration" (Champagne 2015): the action repertoire implemented by an activist group will above all serve to stage a "paper" performance in the sense that it will above all be destined to maximize its media impact in order to influence public opinion.

This spectacular communication will, in the case of the Calais groups, take the form of a "gonzo" or ultra-subjective character whose objective is to give a feeling of immediacy, of close presence. Indeed, the images are of very poor quality, poorly edited with a syncopated rhythm, so as to stage ultra-realism, giving the viewer the impression of being on the "front line". The concept of pornoculture developed by Vincenzo Susca (Attimonelli Susca 2017) is useful here to better understand how this raw representation of direct action will allow these groups to directly reach the subjectivity of its audience. Indeed, pornography is part of this representation regime, raw, immediate subjective, syncopated, bringing the viewer closer to the image.

The images produced by vigilant groups act upon the viewer in that way. By staging their patrolling in an ultra-realistic way, they will encourage their audience to come forward to the "other side of the mirror" and join their action, a call that will be followed to a certain extent. Finally, we will see later that this desire to produce ever more spectacular content could hinder the attempts of these collectives to present themselves as respectable, non-violent, mass movements.

We went several times to Calais in the spring of 2015 and the end of 2016. We opted for a qualitative methodology, permitting detailed analysis, in an ethnographic way, in order to analyze in detail the motivations, words and actions of the actors we met. The backbone of our investigation is fifteen interviews with various actors, between 20 mins. and 1:30, depending on the availability and the propensity to speak of people we met. It is complemented by a thematic analysis of the contents published on the Facebook page of Sauvons Calais and Calaisiens en Colere over a two month period, as well as direct observation of the Sauvons Calais press conference on 7 June 2015. These additional elements allow us to better understand the political communication of those groups. The survey is part of a larger project on the emergence of vigilantism in France. Interviews are recorded when people wish to remain anonymous. If the interviewees accept, they are filmed. It should also be noted that interviews are sometimes made in difficult conditions. Some people, including refugees, are reluctant to talk to us, as they fear reprisals.

In this political framing, the imaginary of the enemy and the spectacle of peril are essential. We will study the implementation of this imaginary through a content analysis carried out on a corpus of images and videos posted on the Facebook pages of these two collectives. We will see that the staging of "vigilance" against a potential "danger" is abundantly mobilized to create a digital affective community and mobilize the audience of these groups.



## 2. The imaginary of danger

The agonistic relationship to the enemy is essential for anti-migrant groups. As part of Carl Schmitt's theorizing of the existence of the enemy as a constitutive possibility of political community, it is the extremely strong opposition to the social group of migrants that is the glue for collective action. The groups present the Calaisian identity as ruined and decrepit, a weak identity, and propose to restore it, by participating to the community of those who lead a political fight. It should be noted that this opposition to the migrant group that would represent the external enemy is complemented by a second enemy, representing the figure of the inner enemy, likened to a "fifth column" such as the theoretician of Revolutionary War like Colonel de Lacheroy conceived it: the social movement supporting the migrants constituted by the NGOs and above all the No Border.

These two extremely strong oppositions are manifested during the press conference of June 7, 2015 where migrants are depicted by terms such as "invasion" and "colonization" that come up very regularly in the speeches. The situation in Calais is described as "abscess". Yvan Benedetti, who speaks for the collective, speaks of migratory submersion, which presages an apocalyptic future for the city, but also for the whole of France. We will analyze the speech he gave during that conference, which we filmed.

According to him, the government would not allow the police to do its job, which would explain the situation. It is a lack of political will that is pointed out and that would justify resorting to vigilantism. To remedy this, Sauvons Calais states several demands, including the dissolution of "migrationnist" groups, who, supposedly "like slavers", are bringing migrants to slaughter for the benefit of "international finance and the oligarchy". They ask for the "dissolution of all NGOs" that help in one way or another migrants and especially No Border, perceived as "the worst enemy of the French".

This request is coupled with a call for the closure of borders and for a total halt of extra-European immigration. According to Yvan Benedetti, "when the plate is empty, there should be no question of bringing extra mouths, foreign mouths to share what little we have left". Moreover, this closure should have humanitarian reasons, to avoid the "human trafficking". The long-term perspective would be to organize the remigration of non-European populations in order to "protect the French". For Benedetti, this mass deportation would avoid suffering for the "uprooted", but also for "ethnic French", depicting immigration as "shared suffering". Finally, adds Benedetti, it would not be necessary to welcome refugees or asylum seekers. Migrants are supposed to be "cowards": if a situation is unbearable, in a country at war, migrants should remain fighting against oppression. Questioning the notion of political refugee, he says, "These men have no courage, what do they have between their legs?".



In Calais, these demands would materialize in a specific project: locking up all migrants in a closed camp. In addition, for the militants of Sauvons Calais, self-defense committees would be “necessary” in order to support the police in the implementation of the camp, not hesitating to denounce and arrest the migrants to intern them in the camp.

### 2.1 “Us” and “them”

While analyzing this speech, the first thing that strikes us is that the opposition between “them” and “us” marks structurally and durably the discourse of those groups. The aspect we have witnessed during that press conference can also be found in the publications on the Facebook pages of these groups. We can start from this particularly significant publication in terms of opposition schemes:

Not only the clandestine manifest, which is totally forbidden for us, Calaisiens, but in addition they tag (with the help of their far-left accomplices) “Fuk France” on the statue of Charles de Gaulle at the Place d’Armes. Little cherry on the cake, a sympathizer of Sauvons Calais is currently in custody for preventing illegal immigrants who were demonstrating from staying in his yard.

This excerpt alone summarizes the structure of the remarks in the following form:

Illegal immigrants & Far-left + Authority /> Calaisiens  
 Degrade - encourage - let go - oppose and are privileged />  
 Victims, legitimate

Around this structural formula emerges the central point of communication of the collective, the “we and the them”. Thus, the profile of Sauvons Calais's page is marked by a very strong content referring to local identity. The analysis of the iconographic content shows an attachment to the city, represented essentially by its coat of arms (white cross on a blue background). More than two-thirds of the profile photographs show slogans to the imperative and the second person plural, “we”. The collective wants to restore the image of a strong and shared identity.

The name of the collective is already an index in itself of the importance of “us” in the construction of its socio-discursive identity. Sauvons Calais calls upon all those who would “save Calais”. A detailed reading of the content and occurrences in opposition to the “us” reveals an identity that is fully political. It would be simplistic to consider that the “us” would be the whole of Calais or even only those Calaisiens threatened or who feel threatened. In the rhetoric used to describe the “us”, it clearly refers to the “active” part of the population of Calais, words such as “do not let us be victimized”, “mobilize us”, “save” and the attacks on those who “complain but do not act” shows that the collective proposes a more complex vision. Not all Calais people



would belong to the "us". Taking part to that political subject is conditioned by acting in the "interests of the inhabitants of Calais", namely against immigration. If this "commitment" begins with liking the page, it becomes a reality and gains strength when participating in the action, denouncing squats or demonstrating.

The "them", on the other hand, is a more disparate political entity. The most important form of this political "they" is determined by the status of "clandestine" systematically used to describe migrants. Indeed, many formulations could have been possible: migrants, immigrants, foreigners, fugitives, exiles, etc. which could have been added "in an irregular situation" to emphasize the status of this "them". The choice to use "clandestine" is a political choice considering migrants as foreign people to "us". The "them" is an absolute, illegitimate and illegal stranger. There is therefore a construction of a political subject in the choice of words that define those who oppose the "we". The "them" is not only limited to migrants, but also to other groups seen as accomplices, such as the No Border. Migrant Support Associations and the "far left" are labeled "pro-clandestine", sometimes with irony and contempt, sometimes with aggressiveness. If the illegals are experienced as a nuisance resulting from the political inability to resolve the situation, No-Border and the far left are experienced as enemies, traitors or "collabos" because they would "encourage" the situation. The use of the term "collabo", referring to the Nazi occupation, is interesting. Indeed, by a semantic reversal of which the far right has the secret, the army of occupation becomes the migrants, supported by "collaborators" of the far left, and the members of the collective can refer themselves to the French Resistance, yet characterized by its antifascism...

Others are designated as adversaries because of their insufficiently active posture. Thus political figures and elected official are seen as "incompetent" and pointed as the source of the problem. The words against them are not as harsh but they belong to that category which is not "us". Finally, the weakest "them" is the inactive Calaisian, who might support the cause from a distance but fails not act. He is considered a potential "we", but by his passivity diminishes the strength of the collective, and makes him a potential adversary of the cause. The mobilization of those "inactive" Calaisians is one of the stated objectives of the page.

## *2.2 Humor: a political weapon?*

The use of the comic register is another aspect of the implementation of this enunciative discourse. It aims to be pleasant, without malice, even if it is macabre or bad taste. A good example is this iconic Decathlon advertising, massively shared, whose posting by an anti-migrant group can easily be interpreted as a call to aggression against migrants.

It is initially a poster placed on one of the Decathlon group stores where we see cartridges of shotguns surmounted by a bird. The legend explains the message of the advertisement: "Special migration", referring to migratory birds. Published on October 12, 2016 on the Facebook wall of Sauvons Calais, this post has elicited 1300 comments



and more than 37 000 shares, which is the sign of a very strong audience. The buzz is even reported by BFM. Beyond the initial intentions of the designers of this advertisement for the French brand of sports products, the addition of the words "Humor Decathlon", followed by an emoticon, allows to reframe metaphorically the reading of the announcement, playing on the polysemy of the term "migration" and its link with shotgun cartridges. An emblematic sign of the vagaries of the moderation of socio-digital networks, the strategy implemented in this specific example seems to work, because the publication has not been removed by Facebook's moderators.



**Figure 1.** *Decathlon « humor »*

In another publication, the community manager of Sauvons Calais invites the public, supported by photography, to "not" compare a migrant who is defecating to a dog. Again, it elicits dehumanizing comments, while using an ironic tone in order to dissociate itself from the potential violence of the subject.

Save Calais

October 23, 2015

"To compare this migrant pooping in the grass near the City to a dog is forbidden by law. Thank you in advance. "

266 "I like", 133 shares, 93 comments, of which:

"Did she pick up what dog owners should do? "

"They do not like pigs, but they themselves are real pigs! "



"And we have to pick up poop from our dogs ..."



**Figure 2.** Photograph of a migrant person, along with the injunction "not" to compare her to a dog

Lastly, there is a last case of publication that illustrates the use of humor in order to mitigate the potentially shocking nature of the subject. It depicts a blonde woman and an African man in "tribal" attire who seems almost completely naked, his sex being covered by the image of the flag of the European Union. The image is accompanied by a parody of the Meetic online dating site logo, parodied into "Meeigrants". The slogan "See bigger and cheaper for your encounters" seems to be a reference to the sex of the partially naked African man. This "meme" is accompanied by an invitation addressed to "No borders," humanists "and other extremists of all kinds": "we open our own meeting site [...] visit our website for more information!". In the form of a joke, activists from the migrant support movement are invited to form romantic relationships with them. It is interesting to note here that the concept of humanism is assimilated to what the collective refers to as leftist extremism.



Sauvons Calais

September 15, 2015 · 🌐

Nous ouvrons notre propre site de rencontre.

No Borders, "humanistes" et extrémistes de gauches en tout genre,  
rendez-vous sur notre site pour plus de renseignements !



**Figure 3.** Image mocking the Meetic dating site, inviting pro-migrant activists to form romantic relationships with migrants

Moreover, this humorous image echoes one of the first campaigns of the German Nazi Party in 1923: when French troops occupied the left bank of the Rhine, the NSDAP (National Socialist Party) launched a campaign denouncing the so-called rapes of German women by colonial troops in the French army from sub-Saharan African countries. These campaigns put forward the threat to the German "racial identity" posed by miscegenation with "black blood", presented as inferior. To the humiliation of the French invasion for the Nazis, this was a second attack, the "defilement" of the "Germanic blood" called *Rassenschande*, that is to say "racial shame" (Chapoutot 2014).



The Sauvons Calais publication fits into this imagery, showing a blonde woman who looks interested in flirtation, reactivating the imaginary of the “shame” related to the relationship between African men and European women. Here again, the distancing induced by the humorous discourse makes it possible to reduce the symbolic burden of extremely polemical remarks, avoiding Facebook’s moderation.

### 3. Le spectacle of vigilance

#### 3.1 Targeted public and spectacular action

We will now focus on the spectacular dimension of the vigilantism of anti-migrant groups in Calais. To better understand the implementation of their repertoire of action, we must remember that according to Charles Tilly, the existence of social movements in their modern form implies the presence of a public opinion . In contrast to revolutionary or insurrectional movements, the tactics of these movements are as follows: through the implementation of actions, which are part of a tactical repertoire, the aim is to raise awareness, and even to strike at public opinion, in order to put pressure on the power in place, sensitive to the variations of this opinion.

As the sociologist Patrick Champagne affirms, public opinion does not exist in itself, but is, on the contrary, artificial: the media and the pollsters will produce or rather build a public opinion which will not necessarily correspond to the real state of the individual opinions of the various people supposed to constitute the citizen body. For Champagne, public opinion is generated by its measurement: polls whose reliability is at least questionable in presenting the opinion of users chosen “randomly”. In this conception, public opinion is an artefact: some media players and polling institutes have the power to construct an image of what citizens are supposed to collectively think .

This model makes these few actors the gatekeepers or guardians of access to mediated visibility and thus to the possibility of influencing public opinion. It is natural that the actions of social movements will then be oriented towards the production of a media image. Actions are staged to appear compatible with the way the media will report them, developing a mainstream mode of storytelling. This orientation conceives the action of social movements as a spectacle in the direction of television media. Describing a farmers' demonstration in the 1980s, Champagne claims that it is a “paper demonstration” because the actions implemented are primarily designed to achieve maximal press coverage. In that case, action is not direct, but mediated, in the direction of the media that hold the power to influence public opinion.

To this extent, the action of social movements therefore consists in the production of a spectacle, hence the importance of developing an imaginary particular to that movement, which will in return resonate with its public’s conceptions. We will add



that the nature of the media will logically influence the content of the actions of social movements. According to Marshall McLuhan, each medium presents different characteristics. This nature then determines the format of the actions: according to the nature of the media the content will be adapted and the spectacle staged by a specific social movement will be different. There is thus a link between the nature of the action repertoire of a social movement and the targeted media.

The model described by Patrick Champagne is adapted to the media landscape of the 1980s. As Stefano Cristante recalls in his model of the doxa sphere, the construction of public opinion has since been jostled by the irruption of social media (Facebook, Twitter ...). These communication tools allow the actors of the social movements to directly reach an audience by constituting a communitarian public without having to go through mainstream media gatekeeping.

These evolutions create a two-headed orientation of the action repertoire of different movements. Some groups, especially on the far right tend to target their audience through social media, especially Facebook, particularly important for its wide coverage of the population. Social networks then constitute a new perspective for the performed action of social movements.

By logics built on virality, massively shared content can gain audiences that compete with mainstream mass media. This mutation creates the possibility for the action of anti-migrant groups to be built on the perspective of creating a spectacle aimed at the public reached through the medium of Facebook

### *3.2 The spectacle of vigilance*

We find the most accomplished expression of these logics in the Calaisiens en colere patrols. They film their vigilant activities and post them online on Facebook, either live or after a summary editing. The comments in these videos present Calais as the state of a war between police and migrants, supposed to be invading the city and creating chaos.



**Figure 4.** *Field monitoring publication*

Translation of the text : “This is the route taken by the “clandestines” today, Thursday the 17th of December. They are heading towards the highway. They are going to attack the truck drivers. This is just their road. The video of the attacks will be uploaded in a few dozen minutes. You will see the number of “clandestines” on the road.”

The activists who patrol in their car intend to provide some kind of "war report" of an imaginary “front line”, and to document in real time the presence of migrants, drawing a map of the danger. In a second time, the activist are not only vigilant, but start to directly intervene. For instance, they will clear barricades erected by migrants trying to cross to Great Britain.

As time goes by, the interventions become more important. In December 2015 and January 2016, the group organizes "security gatherings" around the jungle Jules Ferry while law enforcement officers and migrants clash almost every day. Activists film themselves fighting against migrants and supporting the intervention of the police, playing the role of auxiliary law enforcement (which seems initially accepted by the police). On Facebook support of the police is claimed, even asking the public to join the actions of the collective.



**Figure 5.** *Call to citizens to join the patrols: « This is war, come and help us »*

These videos are widely watched. While the page of Sauvons Calais peaks at 20,000 like after three years of existence, that of the Calaisiens en Colere is followed by 80,000 people just three months after being brought online. Its videos are viewed tens of thousands of times and massively commented, which shows that this spectacle has attracted the attention of a substantial audience.

Thus, the staging of those patrols permits the engagement of the public and creates a community around the page. Nevertheless, it is when the traditional media become interested in the actions publicized on Facebook that the political framing of the collective is questioned. As mentioned earlier, a video of clashes was posted online, staging a person who participates in the "security patrols" of the group declaring "I'm taking out my gun", and then unsheathing what looks like a flashball (a gun firing rubber bullets). Subsequently, it is possible to hear blasts without knowing precisely whether it is the police or the Calaisiens who are at the origin of the gunshots .



This video, posted on the page of the Calaisiens en Colere page, before being quickly withdrawn, became viral and attracted the attention of the media, with several papers questioning the illegality of the participation of the Calaisiens en Colere to clashes with migrants alongside the police .

We see here that social media have not replaced the conventional media in the representation of social movements. On the one hand, the spectacle of vigilance can touch and mobilize a highly ideologically polarized public perceiving migrants as the figure of the enemy. On the other hand, when the same actions pass onto the "mainstream media" sphere, on the contrary they provoke the outrage of the mainstream public and negatively impact the claims to apoliticalism and non-violence of the anti-migrant groups.

The community manager of the pages tried to use strategies in order to distance themselves from the videos, but these strategies did not seem very effective. Finally, the group announced on Facebook that they had put an end to their patrols in February 2016 . Here is a statement by "Laurent", a member of the Calaisiens en Colere who tries to justify himself in the columns of Nord Littoral, a local newspaper.

"Wednesday I was there, yes, but I was not armed with a stick. He says, however, that some of the demonstrators were armed with sticks, "but it was not us! This is also why we are stopping the patrols. And to add, for the defense of the image of the collective: "Some want to come with mace etc. We do not want to be likened to violent people. "[...] Recognized by the activists, he tries to deny his implication. "Three people wear the same jacket as me". A simple coincidence according to him .

The repertoires of actions show themselves to be contradictory in relation to whether they are targeting a social media or mainstream media. The indignation aroused in the classical media puts an end to the actions that were a spectacle initially staged for the audiences centered around the Facebook page of the collective.

## Conclusion

To conclude we can say that those existence of those groups is structured by the perspective of the enemy. It is only by developing an imaginary of the migrant as a political as well as a civilizational enemy that a framing a community become a distinct possibility. Posing as the "other", the migrant allows to recreate an "us", undermined and deeply attacked by various threats. The "us" is not composed of the population of Calais, but by the activists: the political group becomes possible only by engaging into the t group's actions.

In order to achieve that goal, they stage the spectacle of vigilantism. Their first action consists in putting into images the actions of the migrants around Calais and by depicting them as the enemy, threatening to overrun the city. This permits them to be self-depicted as the vanguard fighting this threat and by developing this imaginary of



the enemy, they mobilize their audience. Their public, reached through social media, is invited to directly join anti-migrants patrols, and this spectacle seems to be effective to some extent. However, the specific action repertoire attracts the attention of mainstream media whose audiences are on the contrary shocked by their actions, creating a conflict of legitimacy between the two sets of media and of actions staged in that direction, causing finally those collectives to put an end to their patrols. We see how the imaginary of an enemy allows the creation of a mobilization trying to address specifically the population of Calais, and to engage its followers into a community characterized by insertion in action and activated by a common enemy, following very closely the footprints of the politics of the enemy developed by Carl Schmitt.

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